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Econometrics of the Basu Asymmetric Timeliness Coefficient  
and Accounting Conservatism 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
A substantial literature investigates conditional conservatism, defined as asymmetric accounting 
recognition of economic shocks (“news”), and how it depends on various market, political and 
institutional variables. Studies typically assume the Basu (1997) asymmetric timeliness 
coefficient (the incremental slope on negative returns in a piecewise-linear regression of 
accounting income on stock returns) is a valid conditional conservatism measure.  We analyze 
the measure’s validity, in the context of a model with accounting income incorporating different 
types of information with different lags, and with noise. We demonstrate that the asymmetric 
timeliness coefficient varies with firm characteristics affecting their information environments, 
such as the length of the firm’s operating and investment cycles, and its degree of diversification.  
We particularly examine one characteristic, the extent to which “unbooked” information (such as 
revised expectations about rents and growth options) is independent of other information, and 
discuss the conditions under which a proxy for this characteristic is the market-to-book ratio. We 
also conclude that much criticism of the Basu regression misconstrues researchers’ objectives. 
 
 
Keywords: Conditional conservatism; Timely loss recognition; Basu model; Returns-earnings 
regressions; Earnings response coefficients; Market-to-book ratio.
 
 
Econometrics of the Basu Asymmetric Timeliness Coefficient  
and Accounting Conservatism 
1. Introduction 
Conservatism has been a central accounting principle for centuries (Watts and Zimmerman, 
1986; Basu, 1997; Watts, 2003a).  Basu (1997, p. 7) defines conservatism as “the accountant’s 
tendency to require a higher degree of verification to recognize good news as gains than to recognize 
bad news as losses,”  a definition that is consistent with the adage “anticipate no profits but anticipate 
all losses.” In an efficient market, stock return reflects all new public information, and thus is a valid 
proxy for economic shocks to value. Then, in a piecewise-linear regression of accounting income on 
fiscal-period stock return, the incremental coefficient on negative return (the proxy for negative 
shocks, or “bad news”) is assumed to be a valid measure of asymmetrically timely loss recognition. 1 
Basu predicts and finds that the incremental coefficient indeed is positive, indicating timelier 
incorporation of negative economic shocks than positive shocks.2  
Under this definition of conservatism, how accounting income incorporates shocks to firm 
value depends on their sign, so Ball and Shivakumar (2005) and Beaver and Ryan (2005) term it 
conditional conservatism. This contrasts with defining conservatism as reporting unconditionally low 
earnings or book value of equity. The key difference between these concepts is that conditional 
conservatism carries new information.3  Basu’s formulation of conservatism in this fashion was an 
important breakthrough in our understanding of financial reporting rules and practices. 
In a comparatively short period of time, the Basu (1997) piecewise-linear regression of 
accounting income on stock return has become one of the principal models of the financial 
                                                 
1 We use the term “validity” as shorthand for “construct validity,” which Peter (1981, p. 134) notes “generally is used to 
refer to the vertical correspondence between a construct which is at an unobservable, conceptual level and a purported 
measure of it which is at an operational level.” See the classic Cook and Campbell (1979) text and its following editions. 
2 The model and its origins are described in Basu (2009). 
3 Basu (2005, Section 2), Ball, Kothari, and Robin (2000, fn. 15) and Ball and Shivakumar (2005, 2008).  
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accounting literature. The range and importance of these applications is testimony to the 
pervasiveness of conservatism as a property of financial reporting, and also to researchers’ 
confidence in the validity of their estimates of it. 4  Furthermore, these studies regularly report 
differences in conditional conservatism that are consistent with plausible hypotheses, which provides 
added confidence in the validity of the estimates.  
Nevertheless, researchers have assumed the Basu regression produces valid measures of 
conditional conservatism due largely to its intuitive appeal, without rigorous analysis.5  The need for 
formal econometric analysis is heightened by claims that the Basu asymmetric timeliness coefficient 
is not a valid measure of conservatism (Dietrich et al., 2007), that it is unduly affected by variables 
such as the book-to-market ratio (Pae et al., 2005; Givoly et al., 2007; Roychowdhury and Watts, 
2007), and that Basu coefficients should be avoided by researchers (Patatoukas and Thomas, 2011).   
We build our analysis on a model of the relation between accounting income and economic 
income that captures the salient properties of income recognition as it is practiced.  We then use the 
model to derive and analyze the Basu earnings asymmetric timeliness coefficient. The model 
addresses shocks to firm value that arise from different types of information, and consequently our 
analysis is conducted entirely in the context of “news” and its incorporation in earnings. In particular, 
we ignore variation in expected returns across both time and firms. This framework allows a formal 
derivation of the Basu measure of conservatism, and also improves our understanding of how that 
measure interacts with characteristics of a firm’s information environment.   
The model distinguishes four components of information that financial reporting rules and 
practices cause to be incorporated in accounting income at different points in time. One information 
                                                 
4 As of 24 December 2012, Basu (1997) has 1914 citations in Google Scholar and 319 citations in the Social Sciences 
Citation Index, making it one of the most highly referenced papers in the modern accounting literature. 
5 Basu (1997) offers no formal analysis. Increasingly formal but nevertheless limited analyses are offered in Ball, Kothari 
and Robin (2000), Pope and Walker (1999), Ryan and Zarowin (2003), and Beaver and Ryan (2005). 
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component is incorporated contemporaneously. The second information component is incorporated 
contemporaneously or with a lag, depending on its sign or magnitude. This earnings component is the 
source of conditional conservatism, which arises because negative news about future cash flows is 
subject to a lower accounting verification threshold than positive news. The third information 
component in our model always is incorporated with a lag, such as news about “unbooked” rents or 
growth options. The first three information components are assumed to be reflected in security prices, 
even when they are not recognized in current earnings.  The model also has accounting income 
incorporating “noise,” for example due to random errors in counting inventory or in valuing accounts 
receivable, that reverses over time.  We believe this model incorporates the salient properties of 
accounting recognition rules and practices.  
The primary result in this paper is that the Basu regression provides econometrically valid 
estimates of conditional conservatism. In particular, we show that, holding other things constant, the 
Basu regression identifies conditional conservatism only when it exists.  The model also allows us to 
pursue the secondary goal of this paper, which is to show how conditional conservatism is a function 
of  the relative importance of the various information components. Consequently, we are able to 
formalize and extend the results in Roychowdhury and Watts (2007) on the relation between 
conditional conservatism and market-to-book ratios. We also address the Dietrich et al. (2007) claim 
that return endogeneity and sample truncation lead to biased Basu regression estimates. 
Section 2 outlines the model of the income-return relation that incorporates salient properties 
of accounting income. Section 3 then proceeds with a formal analysis of the Basu regression in the 
context of that model. Section 4 analyzes the relation between timeliness and firm characteristics, the 
role of the market-to-book ratio, and other empirical implications. Section 5 addresses return 
endogeneity and sample truncation. A short summary and our conclusions appear in section 6.   
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2. A framework for interpreting regressions of earnings on returns 
We develop a model of the relation between accounting and economic incomes that 
incorporates realistic and intuitive assumptions about how accounting rules and practices incorporate 
different types of information about economic value into accounting income, depending on properties 
of the information. In subsequent sections we use this model as a framework to analyze the validity 
of Basu regression measures of asymmetrically timely recognition of economic gains and losses. 
2.1 A model of accounting income recognition 
The origins of the following model can be traced back to Ball and Brown (1968), Beaver et al. 
(1980), Fama (1990), Kothari and Sloan (1992), Basu (1997), Kothari (2001), Beaver and Ryan 
(2005), Roychowdhury and Watts (2007), and others. We begin by assuming that capital markets are 
informationally efficient. 6  We focus on shocks to firm value, ignoring variation in expected returns, 
the implicit assumption being that variation in expected returns either does not occur or is controlled 
for as discussed in Ball et al. (2013).  
While informationally efficient returns reflect all publicly available information in a timely 
fashion, we assume that  accounting rules and practices emphasize verifiability, objectivity, and 
conservatism, as reflected for example in the historical cost principle and revenue recognition rules, 
and hence accounting income in any period incorporates some but not all the information that 
becomes publicly available during the period.  The consequence is that accounting income 
incorporates some information with a lag: that is, “prices lead earnings.” 7 
Information in our model can be made public via earnings or any other information channel. 
We do not implicitly or explicitly assume that accounting systems and earnings announcements have 
                                                 
6 Studies using the Basu model typically use annual returns to coincide with the periodicity of reported earnings and the 
settlement period in many contracts based on earnings (notably, debt, supply and compensation agreements). As argued in 
Ball et al. (2000), annual horizons substantially mitigate concerns about the informational efficiency of security prices. 
7 That prices lead earnings is clear from the graphs in Ball and Brown (1968), Foster et al. (1984) and Bernard and Thomas 
(1990), and from the longer-horizon studies of Beaver, Lambert and Morse (1980) and Kothari and Sloan (1992). 
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no role in price formation.  We assume only that, to the extent the market responds to reported 
earnings, it understands its components.  In particular, the market distinguishes the components that 
reflect information made public in prior periods from those that reflect current-period information.  
In line with the above assumptions, the total revision in security price (i.e., stock return) 
comprises three components, which are incorporated in accounting income differently: 
Rt = xt + yt + gt          (2.1) 
It = xt + wt yt + (1 – wt-1)yt-1 + gt-1 + єt – є t-1      (2.2) 
where the subscripts t and t–1 refer to time periods, and: 
Rt =  total unexpected security return;8   
 
xt =  portion of the total unexpected return Rt that invariably is contemporaneously captured in 
accounting income, It; 
 
yt  =  portion of the total unexpected return Rt that is not contemporaneously captured in It unless 
required by conservative accounting;  
 
gt = portion of the total unexpected return Rt that never is contemporaneously captured in It, but 
always is incorporated with a lag; 
 
It  =  accounting income; 
 
wt =  is an indicator variable that takes the value of one when conservative accounting rules and 
practices lead to recognition of y in the current period; and 
 
єt = “noise” in accounting earnings that reverses in the next period. 
 
The unexpected return components xt, yt, and gt are stationary and time-independent random 
variables (Bachelier 1900, Samuelson 1965, Fama, 1970; Campbell et al., 1997) whose variances are 
denoted by x2, y2, and g2, respectively, and:  
corr(xt, yt) = ρxy   > 0,  corr(xt, gt) = ρxg > 0,  and  corr(yt, gt) = ρyg > 0  (2.3) 
Accounting-induced noise єt has variance є 2 and is assumed independent of return components. 
                                                 
8 We ignore dividends, the implicit assumption being Miller-Modigliani dividend irrelevance. 
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 To keep the analysis tractable, we make the following linearity assumption. We assume that 
the information components x, y, and g can be expressed as linear functions of each other (e.g., 
ݔ ൌ ݂ሺݕ, ݃ሻ ൅ ݁ where ݂ሺ. , . ሻ is linear and ݁ is an uncorrelated residual), which we operationalize by 
assuming that the variance-covariance matrix of x, y, and g is independent of the sign of news. This 
implies that covሺݔ, ݕ|ݔ ൐ 0ሻ ൌ 	covሺݔ, ݕ|ݔ ൏ 0ሻ; or more generally, covሺݔ, ݕ|ܴ ൐ 0ሻ ൌ
	covሺݔ, ݕ|ܴ ൏ 0ሻ and varሺݔ|ܴ ൐ 0ሻ ൌ varሺݔ|ܴ ൏ 0ሻ, so that corrሺݔ, ݕ|ܴ ൐ 0ሻ ൌ corrሺݔ, ݕ|ܴ ൏ 0ሻ.9 
This assumption allows us to focus on the effect of conservatism and ignore other potential sources of 
non-linearity in the return-earnings relation, such as an arbitrary non-linear relation between the 
information components x and y or between x and g.10 To the extent such non-linearities are present, 
they comprise a confounding factor (akin to an omitted variables problem) that needs to be 
understood and controlled for when estimating conditional conservatism.  
2.2 An interpretation of the model in terms of accounting practices 
In this model, financial reporting rules and practices lead to accounting income always 
contemporaneously incorporating the information component xt, regardless of its sign or magnitude 
(i.e., without conditional conservatism). The intuition is that this component represents the least 
costly source of information to verify, and thus it invariably is recognized in the same period as it 
affects returns. This type of information could include current-period news about current-period cash 
flow, such as learning the actual cash realizations of current period revenues and expenses in 
comparison with their expectations.  It also could include news about future cash flows that is 
verifiable at low cost, and that is incorporated symmetrically in accounting income via working 
capital accruals. Symmetrically low-cost verification typically applies to current operating-cycle 
information, such as cash receipts and payments, and the quantities of accounts receivable, accounts 
                                                 
9  In contrast, the distribution of earnings generally will be left skewed, not symmetric, due to conditional conservatism. 
10 Equations 2.1 and 2.2 show that these would induce non-linearity in the relation between I and R. As discussed in 
Section 3.1, the shape of the return distribution per se does not invalidate the Basu (1997) measure.  
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payable and inventories. For example, accruals are used to adjust current-period cash flow for both 
increases and decreases in the quantity of closing inventory relative to opening inventory, because 
they are approximately equally low in cost to verify.  Similarly, cash collections from customers are 
adjusted for both increases and decreases in accounts receivable.  These working capital accruals 
incorporate into accounting income current information about future cash flows. For example, other 
things equal an increase in closing inventory is information that less cash will be spent on purchasing 
inventory in future periods, and it is verifiable at low cost regardless of its sign. In some limited 
circumstances, symmetrically low-cost verification can apply to long-cycle information as well, an 
example being index funds, in which gains and losses on long term investments in traded stocks are 
symmetrically low-cost to verify and in practice are both accounted on a daily basis. 
The second component of stock return, yt, is incorporated in accounting income either 
contemporaneously or with a lag, depending on the accounting operator wt. The intuition here is that 
yt represents information that is costly to verify, and more cost is incurred in verifying negative than 
positive news. Consequently the verification threshold is lower for negative news (Basu 1997, page 
4), and this information component is incorporated asymmetrically. Such information could include 
the current-period revision in the expectation of unrealized future-period cash flows from “booked” 
assets, including long term assets in place and purchased intangible assets such as patents and 
goodwill. It could include information about the marketability of current assets such as inventory. 
This component also could include news about the present value of future-period cash outflows, such 
as lawsuit settlements. Using accrual accounting to bring forward shocks to expected future cash 
flows is known as timely gain and loss recognition.  Conditional conservatism implies that w is more 
likely to be triggered by bad news (adverse shocks to expected future cash flows) than good news, 
and hence that loss recognition generally is timelier than gain recognition.  
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In the event that timely recognition is not triggered and thus the return component yt is not 
contemporaneously incorporated in income, it is incorporated with a lag, the intuition being that some 
revisions in expectations of future cash flows are not reflected in accounting income until the actual 
cash flow realizations occur. Conditional conservatism implies that incorporation with a lag is more 
likely for good news than bad. The effect of asymmetrically delayed incorporation of information is 
that, in a two-period model, the total effect on current period income is wt yt + (1 – wt-1)yt-1.   
In practice, the extent of the timely recognition asymmetry is determined by a number of 
factors. An extensive literature studies determinants that include economic incentives, debt and 
compensation contracting, governance, GAAP, regulation, and taxes.  Since our objective is not to 
provide an equilibrium model of the extent of conditional conservatism, but rather to investigate the 
validity of the Basu (1997) measure used in this literature, our model takes the extent of the 
asymmetry as an exogenous given, and studies the properties of its measurement.  In our setting, 
timely recognition is triggered when y is below an exogenous threshold c.11   
The third component of stock return, gt-1, invariably is incorporated in accounting income 
with a lag. One source of this return component is revisions in the value of growth options or 
unbooked intangibles (Beaver and Ryan 2005). This information component is similar in nature to 
“rents” in Roychowdhury and Watts (2007). Because growth options by definition are not “booked” 
as assets on balance sheets, these shocks to firm value are symmetrically incorporated in earnings 
with a lag, when the associated cash flows are (or are not) realized. 
The model also has accounting income incorporating uncorrelated “noise” that reverses over 
time. An important source of this earnings component would be imperfect accounting accruals. For 
example, miscounting inventory affects current and future earnings with opposing signs. Other 
examples are errors in estimating uncollectible accounts receivable, errors in forecasting deferred tax 
                                                 
11 Alternatively, timely loss recognition can occur with probability p which can be a function of y, i.e., Pr(w=1| y) = p(y)). 
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liabilities, the effects of using historical-cost interest rates on debt, and errors in estimating assets’ 
useful lives.  Because accounting errors reverse over time, in our two-period model the error term is 
reversed out in the following period. For tractability we assume accounting error is uncorrelated with 
return components, and thus we ignore non-random “earnings management,” including “smoothing,” 
that plausibly is negatively correlated with returns. 12  
In this formulation, yt-1 and gt-1 are the two sources of delayed recognition.  They generate the 
anticipated or stale component of earnings whose value consequences were previously reflected in 
returns. They therefore are uncorrelated with current period return Rt, which is influenced only by 
information arriving contemporaneously. We view this lagged recognition of some components of 
stock return as a natural feature of the income recognition process in accounting, which can be 
measured and investigated (for example, as a function of firm characteristics, managers’ incentives, 
or countries’ economic and political institutions).    
While yt-1 and gt-1 are assumed to be uncorrelated with xt, yt, and gt, and, therefore, with Rt, 
there are economic reasons to expect a positive correlation among xt, yt, and gt.  Recall that all three 
components are a consequence of economic news affecting investors’ cash flow expectations.  
However, only the news generating the stock price growth rate component xt, and possibly also yt 
(i.e., when wt = 1), is incorporated in accounting income contemporaneously, whereas news 
generating the return component gt finds its way into accounting income in the following period.   
The earnings process modeled in Equation (2.2) is intended to capture the important 
properties of asymmetric accounting recognition rules and practices, and their effect on how new 
information is incorporated in reported earnings.  We next use this framework to investigate the 
properties of the Basu measure and develop empirical implications. 
                                                 
12 Knowledge of єt-1 would help predict earnings, but not returns. We assume the market unravels the current accounting 
error єt and does not react to it. This assumption can be relaxed without altering our conclusions.  
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3. Econometrics of the Basu Regression 
3.1 Representing Timeliness as the Conditional Expectation of Earnings 
The Basu (1997) model is used to measure the (asymmetric) timeliness of earnings with 
respect to economic news, where timeliness is the extent to which a dollar of unexpected economic 
income is reflected, on average in accounting income over a certain period.  Over a firm’s life (or a 
sufficiently long period), and assuming “clean surplus” accounting, each dollar of stock returns 
translates into a dollar of earnings.  Over shorter time periods (e.g., years), however, there is no one-
to-one mapping between earnings and returns and thus they can be thought of (and modeled) as 
random variables sharing a joint probability distribution ݂ሺܴ௧, ܫ௧ሻ. Statistically, earnings timeliness is 
thus the expectation of earnings conditional on return news ܴ௧, or ܧሺܫ௧	|ܴ௧ሻ. Note that this 
conditional expectation is not a point estimate but is a function ˆ(.) of ܴ௧. The conservative nature of 
accounting suggests the shape of this function is non-linear, which the Basu (1997) model 
accommodates by specifying a pricewise linear regression of earnings ܫ௧ on returns ܴ௧.  
To see if the least squares regression of earning on returns achieves the objective of 
measuring earnings timeliness, consider the following (general) model specification: 
 ( )t t tI R    (3.1)  
where (.) is an arbitrary function, and where ܫ௧ and ܴ௧ are observed contemporaneously. A well-
known result is that: 
 2
( )
ˆ( | ) argmin ( ( )) ( )t t t t t
R
E I R E I R R

     (3.2)  
It follows directly from result (3.2) that, for a correctly specified functional form, the least squares 
estimation of (3.1) yields an unbiased conditional expectation. This is true irrespective of the 
distributional assumptions made with respect to ܫ௧ and ܴ௧. Thus, a regression of earnings on returns 
fulfills its research objective of representing timeliness.  
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3.2 Simple case with no accounting asymmetry 
We now use the framework from Section 2 to examine a baseline case with no accounting 
asymmetry (i.e., wt = 0), and hence where financial reporting incorporates all news of type y with a 
lag regardless of its sign, in the same fashion as gt.  Consider the econometric properties of regressing 
accounting income on security return:  
t t tI R              (3.3) 
In this case, the slope coefficient reflects the extent to which accounting income contemporaneously 
captures “good” and “bad” news equally.  Let ˆ denote the OLS estimate, such that:  
plim ˆ =  cov(It, Rt)/var(Rt) 
 =  cov(xt + yt-1 + gt-1 + єt - єt-1, xt + yt + gt)/var(xt + yt + gt)   (3.4) 
The lagged income components, yt-1 and gt-1, do not correlate with xt, yt, and gt, so in the symmetric 
accounting case:  
plim ˆ =  (var(xt)+cov(xt, yt + gt))/ (var(xt)+2cov(xt, yt + gt)+var(yt + gt)).  (3.5) 
In equation (3.5), the estimated slope coefficient from a regression of earnings on 
contemporaneous returns increases in the timeliness of earnings, var(xt)/var(yt + gt), which is the ratio 
of the information in returns that accounting income incorporates in a timely fashion to the 
information it incorporates with a lag.  Equivalently, as timeliness increases the contribution to 
current accounting income It of stale news, yt-1 and gt-1, is relatively lower.   
In one extreme, accounting income is 100% timely with respect to economic income if var(yt) 
and var(gt) both are zero, in which case ˆ  converges to one and accounting income perfectly 
correlates with stock returns.  This extreme is approximated by unlevered firms investing in actively-
traded securities that are marked to market, such as mutual funds. In the other extreme, accounting 
income is completely untimely for firms consisting entirely of growth options, as approximated by 
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start-up firms investing almost entirely in intellectual property. In this case, var(xt) and var(yt) both 
are zero, ˆ  converges to zero, and accounting income is uncorrelated with stock return.   
3.3 Asymmetric timeliness  
 We now consider the more general case with asymmetric timeliness, where the function 
ܧሺܫ	|ܴሻ is expected to be non-linear due to accounting conservatism. We demonstrate that 
conservatism implies that a piecewise linear regression model following Basu (1997) will correctly 
identify the asymmetry in earnings timeliness. In terms of our model (2), we now consider a case 
where financial reporting incorporates the information component y without a lag whenever it is 
below a threshold (i.e., wt > 0), but otherwise with a lag.  
The Basu (1997) asymmetric timeliness coefficient is estimated from the regression model: 
1 2 1 2t t t t t tI D R D R                (3.6) 
where Dt = 0 if Rt ≥ 0, Dt = 1 if Rt < 0, and 2 is the asymmetric timeliness coefficient. 2 then is the 
incremental coefficient on negative return (the proxy for negative economic income), and is predicted 
to be positive because conditionally conservative accounting  incorporates negative economic income 
into accounting income sooner than it incorporates positive economic income.  
Let 2ˆ  denote the OLS estimate of 2 from equation (3.6). Then we have: 
2 2 1
ˆplim    ,         (3.7)  
where  1
cov( , | 0)
var( | 0)
t t t
t t
I R R
R R
    and 2
cov( , | 0) .
var( | 0)
t t t
t t
I R R
R R
    
Timely loss recognition in accounting is not triggered by all types of economic loss. Our 
model (2) represents this by assuming symmetrically timely recognition for the verifiable information 
component xt, asymmetrically timely recognition of the information component y that is triggered 
only when it falls below a threshold value such as zero, and symmetrically untimely recognition of 
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the information component gt.  These individual components are unobservable to the researcher, so 
the Basu regression model (3.6) conditions the regression slope on total return Rt, which is 
observable. Because total return incorporates information components that are not recognized 
asymmetrically, there is a question as to whether the Basu regression provides a valid measure of 
conditional conservatism. We now show that the incremental regression coefficient 2 = 0 if earnings 
is not conditionally conservative, and 2 > 0 if earnings is conditionally conservative.   
Our analysis incorporates what we believe to be a realistic scenario, that xt, yt, and gt are 
positively correlated.  The algebra under that assumption is tedious, so we relegate derivations to the 
Appendix.   
 3.3.1 Basu regression coefficients with conditionally conservative accounting. We next 
derive the estimate for the  coefficient under conditionally conservative accounting, and then show 
that it behaves in a predictable fashion as a function of the firm’s information environment.  
We begin by considering a simpler case in which the information component g is zero (this is 
relaxed in Section 4 below). Then: 
1 1 1
1
cov( (1 ) , | 0)
var( | 0)
t t t t t t t t t t
t t
x w y w y x y R
R R
                (3.8) 
cov( , | 0) cov( , | 0)
var( | 0)
t t t t t t t t t
t t
x x y R w y x y R
R R
          (3.9) 
Equation (3.9) follows from the assumption that all shocks to stock returns (and thus total return) are 
independent over time. Similarly: 
 2
cov( , | 0) cov( , | 0)
var( | 0)
t t t t t t t t t
t t
x x y R w y x y R
R R
           (3.10) 
The assumption that the variance-covariance matrix of the three information components in returns is 
independent of the sign of economic news implies that var(Rt |Rt ≥ 0) = var(Rt |Rt < 0), and we have: 
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2
cov( , | 0) cov( , | 0)ˆplim
var( | 0)
t t t t t t t t t t
t t
w y x y R w y x y R
R R
           (3.11) 
Henceforth we drop the subscript t, and all variables occur at time t unless explicitly subscripted t–1.  
We model conditional conservatism as recognition of y in the current period only when it is 
sufficiently “bad news.”  We assume 1tw   if ty c  and zero otherwise, where c is a threshold below 
which current period recognition occurs.  In a limiting case where c   , timely recognition of y 
always occurs, there is symmetric recognition of good and bad news, and thus, 2ˆplim = 0.  
Symmetry also exists in the limiting case of c   , where timely recognition of y never occurs.  The 
set up then degenerates to w = 0, as analyzed in section 3.2. 
We set the threshold c to zero in line with the adage “anticipate no profits, but anticipate all 
losses” and to reconcile with the empirical formulation of the Basu (1997) regression. In practice, c 
could be expected to be negative and close to zero. To the best of our knowledge, this assumption is 
not restrictive and does not bias the results.   
To show that 2ˆ  is positive under these assumptions, it suffices to show that: 
cov( , | 0) cov( , | 0) 0wy x y R wy x y R            (3.12) 
Equation (3.12) can be expressed as: 
1 2
3 4
0 0
2 2
0 0
( , | 0) ( , | 0)
( , | 0) ( , | 0)
y
y
y
y
y x y R dxdy y x y R dxdy
xy x y R dxdy xy x y R dxdy
 
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
     
   
   
   
 
  
( | 0) ( | 0)E x y R E y y   

  
(3.13)  
where ߮ሺ. , . ሻ is a bivariate probability density function. This equation results from expanding 
equation (3.12) to separate its x and y components and expressing it in the form of expectations. The 
last term follows conveniently from the linearity assumption that the variance-covariance matrix of x 
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is y is independent of the news sign, which implies that ( | 0)E x y R  = ( | 0)E x y R    and that 
( | 0) ( | 0) ( | 0)E wy R E wy R E y y     . 
To explicitly evaluate the integrals, we further introduce the assumption that ߮ሺ. , . ሻ follows 
Normality. Under this assumption we have (see Appendix for derivation13): 
1 2 0.5 2 0.52 (1 ) (1 arctan( ) (1 ) )y x xy            ,    (3.14) 
where 
2
2 0.5 (0, )(1 )
y x xy
xy x
    
   .   
It further can be shown that for any positive ,  the expression for   is positive (one way to see this 
is to note that (0) 0  and that first derivative of   is positive over the interval ሺ0, +∞ሻ).14 This 
result implies the Basu incremental coefficient on negative returns reflects the existence of 
conditional conservatism in accounting income.  
3.3.2 Basu regression coefficients in the absence of conditional conservatism. As a validity 
check, consider the asymmetric timeliness coefficient in the absence of conditional conservatism. In 
this case, accountants symmetrically do not recognize any of the information in yt in the current 
period t, regardless of how negative, i.e. wt = 0 for all yt. Under the linearity assumption, the equation 
(3.11) implies plim 2ˆ ൌ 	0. Thus, under the null hypothesis of no conditional conservatism, the Basu 
coefficient is zero. Indeed, this should be the case if the model is well-specified and the coefficient is 
a valid measure of conditional conservatism.  
3.3.3 Basu regression coefficient validity. We conclude that the Basu asymmetric timeliness 
coefficient 2ˆ is positive in the presence of conditional conservatism, and zero in the absence of 
                                                 
13 The Appendix provides derivation for a more general case where the information component g also is present. The 
result below is thus a special case that obtains when setting g=0 or, in other words, setting z=x.  
14 Taking the second derivative indicates that the first derivative is increasing over the interval (0,√3] and is decreasing 
over the interval [√3, +∞ሻ, but asymptotes to a positive constant. 
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conditional conservatism, consistent with it being a valid estimator. This result contradicts the claims 
of Dietrich et al. (2007), to which we return below. Further, the coefficient is not driven by a single 
structural parameter but rather is a function of conditional accounting conservatism and other 
attributes of the information environment, including information about growth options 
(Roychowdhury and Watts, 2007), which we discuss in more detail in the following section.  
 
4. Conditional conservatism, firm characteristics and empirical implications 
  
In this section, we demonstrate that the asymmetric timeliness coefficient varies with firm 
characteristics affecting their information environments, such as the length of the operating and 
investment cycle, and the degree of diversification.  We particularly examine one characteristic, the 
relative amount of symmetrically “unbooked” information (notably, revised expectations about rents 
or growth options) and the extent to which it is correlated with other information components. We 
then discuss the conditions under which a proxy for this characteristic is the market-to-book ratio, 
formalizing and extending the analysis in Roychowdhury and Watts (2007), among others. 
4.1 The role of information about growth options and rents 
Consider the case where the variance of the information component g in economic income is 
non-zero. Current-period accounting income then includes a component that is a function of past 
shocks to the firm’s growth options. In our two-period model, equation (2.2) has shocks to growth 
options showing up in accounting income with a simple one-period lag.   
Define z x g  , 2 var( ),z z   and cov( , ) cov( , )corr( , ) .var( ) var( )
y x y gz y
y x g
       (4.1) 
 
The Basu asymmetric timeliness coefficient then is given by (see the Appendix for the derivation): 
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 
2
2
2
1 1 1
cov( , | 0) cov( , | 0)ˆplim
var( | 0)
2 1
1 arctan( ) 1 0
( 2) var( )
y z
wy x y g R wy x y g R
R R
R

     
       
    
   (4.2) 
where 
Several limiting cases are of interest. To avoid cumbersome notation, here we loosely refer to 
plim 2ˆ as 2 . As the correlation coefficient between z and y approaches 1, we have: 
1 2lim
y
y z

              (4.3) 
This result is intuitive and suggests the asymmetric timeliness coefficient depends on the variance of 
y relative to the total variance of returns, as one would expect when the components are perfectly 
correlated. 15 As one also would expect, 2lim 1y   , and 0 2lim 0y   . In the first case the 
variation in y subsumes all other components, while in the second there is no role of conditionally 
conservative accounting.  Finally, 2lim 0z    and 0 2lim 1z   , which mirror the previous results 
and also are intuitive. The limiting cases suggest the Basu specification captures the extent of 
accounting conservatism in a meaningful and intuitive way.  
We now show that the Basu asymmetric timeliness coefficient declines in the variance of 
growth options.  The derivative of 2 with respect to z is:  
  
 2 2 22 2 2 22 1 ( ) arctan( ) 1 ,( 2)( 2 )y y z y z y y zz y y z z                           (4.4) 
where  21 arctan( ) 1 0        .  This expression is negative for economically meaningful 
values of the parameters and the expression for 2  is symmetric in ߪ௫ and ߪ௚. Since ߪ௭ is increasing 
                                                 
15 Equation (4.2) seems to suggest that ߚଶ	approaches zero as  approaches 1. However, ߙଵ then tends to plus infinity. 
1 2 0.5 (0, )(1 )
y z
z
    
  
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in both ߪ௫ and ߪ௚, it follows that, holding the correlation coefficient  constant, 2  is decreasing in 
ߪ௫ and ߪ௚.  This result is intuitive, in that the x and g components of revision in price are treated 
symmetrically in financial reporting (fully incorporated and fully ignored, respectively), whereas the 
y component is treated asymmetrically (incorporated only if below a threshold). 
Figure 1 graphs the asymmetric timeliness coefficient as a function of ߪ௚ and ߪ௬.  Other 
parameters are fixed at the following levels: 0.3xz xg    and 0.2x  .16  As expected, the 
coefficient increases in the variance of y (reaching 1 in the limit), as timely loss recognition becomes 
more important.  Figure 1 also illustrates that asymmetrically timely loss recognition decreases in the 
variance of g (information about growth options), reaching zero in the limit.  This result also is 
intuitive. Shocks to growth expectations are not captured contemporaneously in accounting income, 
so in a regression of accounting income on stock returns their variability ߪ௚ dampens the coefficient 
on returns. These results confirm the original conjecture of Ball, Kothari and Robin (2000, p. 48) that 
asymmetric earnings timeliness is a function of the amount of news about “unbooked” growth options 
relative to news from other sources.  
[Figure 1 about here.] 
4.2 Effect of correlation among components of earnings innovations.  
The literature is silent on how asymmetric timeliness is affected by complementarities or 
correlations among the information components that drive returns but that are reflected in earnings in 
different periods.  We use equation (4.2) to plot 2  as a function of the correlations xg and yg  (we 
do not separately consider yx  since it is easy to see that its effect is the same as that of yg ).  
[Figure 2 about here.] 
                                                 
16 Analogous results obtain when other parameters are fixed at different levels, including correlation coefficients of zero. 
For illustration, we report the results only under one set of parameters.  
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Figure 2 presents results when other parameters are fixed at the levels: 0.3xy  and 
0.2x y g     . As the figure shows, asymmetric timeliness increases in yg , the correlation 
between y and g, and it decreases in xg , the correlation between x and g. Intuitively, the first result 
obtains because in our model y exhibits timely recognition, but the researcher observes total return Rt, 
which also contains other information components. As the correlation between the return components 
y and g strengthens, the Basu model’s asymmetric timeliness coefficient increases.  Similarly, the 
second result obtains because variation in the sum of the symmetrically-recognized x and g 
components becomes more pronounced due to their covariability, and the conditional conservatism 
asymmetry becomes less salient. Thus, the correlations and interactions between different 
information components are expected to have an effect on timely loss recognition empirically.  
4.3. Earnings timeliness and market-to-book.  
In this subsection, we discuss the relation between the (beginning-of-period) market-to-book 
ratio (݉/ܾ) and asymmetric timeliness, which has been the subject of some controversy in the 
literature. A number of studies (e.g., Pae et al. 2005, Givoly et al. 2007) show that this relation is 
negative and, to the extent ݉/ܾ is also a measure of conservatism, these studies suggest the Basu 
measure is biased. Roychowdhury and Watts (2007) provide the most recent and comprehensive 
treatment on this subject by proposing a theoretical framework that explains the inverse relation of 
asymmetric timeliness and ݉/ܾ (see also Beaver and Ryan, 2005). We start by summarizing their 
arguments and then explain how we complement and extend their analysis. 
Roychowdhury and Watts (2007) decompose equity value into separable assets and rents. 
Separable assets include unverifiable assets in excess of cost, verifiable assets in excess of cost, and 
assets at cost (net of depreciation and impairments). Rents stand for above-competitive future returns 
and may (but need not) include growth options, synergies, monopoly power, etc. They argue that 
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accounting excludes the measurement of rents or their changes in the financial statements in part 
because they are unverifiable.  Further, they maintain that conservatism is characterized by the degree 
of understatement of net separable assets on the balance sheet, not due to the omission of rents from 
the financial statements. Consequently, in the context of the Basu regression model, Roychowdhury 
and Watts (2007) view rents and changes in rents as measurement error arising from using stock 
prices and stock returns, respectively, to infer properties of balance sheet and income statement 
information. Because rents are reflected in the numerator of /ܾ , econometrically ݉/ܾ serves as a 
proxy for the measurement error in returns, the independent variable in the Basu regression model, 
which in turn attenuates the Basu measure of conservatism.17   
We start by noting an important conceptual point of distinction of our model. Viewed from 
the perspective of timeliness, news about rents (in our notation, g) is not measurement error because 
rents eventually are converted into net assets (ultimately, cash) and go through the income statement. 
By the time the conversion takes place, the stock price already has reflected g. Therefore, the 
matching between stock returns and earnings is a matter of time, or leads and lags. Given that the 
objective of Basu model is to measure timeliness, g is a natural information component that affects 
overall and asymmetric timeliness (as Figure 1 indicates). Since ݉/ܾ is likely correlated with the 
relative variance of g, the negative relation between ݉/ܾ and conditional conservatism is a natural 
property of accounting earnings in our model.18  
Our model advances the analysis in Roychowdhury and Watts (2007) in three ways. First, our 
model shows that the effect of ݉/ܾ on asymmetric timeliness is more complex than first appears. 
The analyses in subsection 4.1 and subsection 4.2 demonstrate that the Basu coefficient is not 
                                                 
17 A similar conclusion follows from Beaver and Ryan’s (2005) simulation that alters intangibles intensity, changes in 
which are viewed as noise. 
18 Whether one calls this a “measurement error” problem or a natural property of accounting earnings is at one level a 
semantic issue. Nevertheless, this issue is important as the appropriate econometric solutions differ, depending on the 
context (as discussed further below).  
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determined by the amount of rents (or growth options) relative to other assets per se, but by the 
relative amounts of new information about them and how this information is correlated with other 
information: i.e., it is a second moment effect. For example, consider a firm such as a regulated utility 
where shocks to the value of asymmetrically booked assets (y in our notation) are negligible, i.e.,
0y  . At this extreme, all information about firm value is incorporated symmetrically in earnings, 
so here too the incremental Basu slope is zero, independent of ݉/ܾ. More generally, a higher ݉/ܾ 
could imply a simultaneous increase in the variance of g and a decrease in the variance of x. As 
equation (4.4) and Figure 1 indicate, the effect on asymmetric timeliness is ambiguous in such case.  
Further, while Roychowdhurry and Watts (2007) assume that rents are independent of other 
information types (p. 11), we show that the correlation between shocks to assets in place and growth 
options can affect the relation between earnings timeliness and market-to-book ratios. In particular, 
Figure 2 indicates that, if higher ݉/ܾ also leads to a higher correlation between y and g, the link of 
݉/ܾ and asymmetric timeliness is not necessarily negative. 
Second, Roychowdhury and Watts (2007) argue that asymmetric timeliness should become 
more pronounced over longer earnings horizons because rents convert to separable assets and thus 
their negative effect on the Basu measure diminishes. Our analysis generalizes this argument, but also 
suggests that the effect of horizon is not always clear. Intuitively, as the return period is extended 
back, current-period earnings reflect more of the growth options at the beginning of the period. 
Further, shocks to growth options are more likely to flow through the financials over longer horizons.  
One can think of this as increasing the variance of x or y relative to the variance of g. On the one 
hand, to the extent that a longer horizon means that g can be treated as y, i.e., the relative variance of 
y widens, asymmetric timeliness increases. On the other hand, over an even longer horizon x can 
replace g, in which case the relative variance of x widens and asymmetric timeliness decreases 
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(intuitively, over sufficiently long horizons earnings approximate returns and hence the asymmetry 
should disappear).  
Finally, our model implies that there are important non-linearities and interactions in the 
relation between asymmetric timeliness and the variances of x, y, and g (and hence ݉/ܾ), as 
illustrated in Figure 1.  
An important related question is whether the validity of the Basu asymmetric timeliness 
coefficient as a proxy for conditional conservatism is threatened because in fact Basu coefficients and 
market-to-book ratios are negatively correlated.19  Indeed, the negative correlation has lent credence 
to criticisms that the Basu asymmetric timeliness coefficient is flawed (Dietrich et al., 2007; 
Patatoukas and Thomas, 2011). Our analysis suggests otherwise, as it demonstrates that Basu 
coefficients derive from an interaction between asymmetrically conservative accounting rules and 
practices and the underlying economic characteristics of the firm. Depending on one’s research 
objectives, controlling for firm characteristics may or may not be appropriate. As an example, 
consider Nikolaev’s (2010) hypothesis that financial covenants are effective in distressed situations 
only if there is timely recognition of losses in earnings, and evidence that financial covenants in 
public debt contracts indeed are correlated with firms’ Basu coefficients.  For this research question, 
it is not essential whether the size of the Basu coefficient derives from firm characteristics, from 
accounting, or from the way they intersect.20   
4.4 Other determinants of conditional conservatism.   
The result that asymmetric timeliness is decreasing in ߪ௫ is intuitive in our setup and presents 
several additional empirical predictions.  For example, companies with short operating cycles, short 
                                                 
19 Gigler and Hemmer (2001), Richardson and Tinaikar (2004), Beaver and Ryan (2005), Price (2005), Pae, Thornton, 
and Welker (2005), Givoly, Hayn, and Natarajan (2007), and Roychowdhury and Watts (2007). 
20 Ball et al. (2008) raise the related issue of whether firm characteristics truly are exogenous in cross-country research on 
the effects of accounting rules and practices, or whether they are determined jointly. 
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investment cycles, short asset maturity, or companies with a substantial realized component of 
economic income, are expected to exhibit lower levels of timely loss recognition.  This reconciles 
with the evidence of Khan and Watts (2009), and also with their prediction that conditional 
conservatism increases in environmental uncertainty, which we expect to be inversely related to the 
variance of x and positively related to the variance of y (due to different verification requirements for 
earnings components that are more uncertain and more costly to verify).  
Finally, we note that asymmetric timeliness is not affected by є 2, the amount of accounting-
induced noise. This is a direct consequence of accounting income being specified as the dependent 
variable (as well as noise being assumed independent of all return components). The implication is 
that, while asymmetric timeliness is a valid property of accounting income, it is by no means a 
complete measure of accounting quality. In particular, it does not reflect random accruals errors, such 
as errors in recording inventory receivables and payables. 
 
5. Return Endogeneity and Sample Truncation 
Dietrich et al. (2007), henceforth DMR, argue that the Basu regression specification is 
misspecified for two reasons: earnings cause returns; and conditioning on the sign of the returns 
induces sample truncation bias. Both claims are based on a misconception that the objective of a Basu 
specification is to estimate structural parameters in the model (DMR, p. 100): 
 t t tR I    (5.1) 
where the error term t is independent of It, and  is known as the “earnings response coefficient.”21  
DMR show that OLS slope coefficient from a “reverse” regression of earnings I on returns R 
is a biased estimator of the inverse of earnings response coefficient, 1/ , because the error term in the 
                                                 
21 Because this model suppresses conditional conservatism, the variable I in this section is different from the variable I in 
our analyses above. In particular, DMR’s (9.3) and derivative equations cannot be substituted into our earlier equations.  
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reverse model is not independent of Rt. This well-known result is irrelevant if the research objective 
is to measure how accounting income incorporates the information in stock return, i.e., to estimate the 
functional shape of the conditional expectation E(I |R), in which case (5.1) is the incorrect 
specification. As shown in section 3.1, least squares regression achieves that research objective 
without bias. 
 Second, DMR (p. 102) argue that conditioning the regression of earnings on returns upon the 
sign of returns induces “sample truncation bias.” Specifically, DMR argue that the conditions 
( | 0) 0E I R    and ( | 0) 0E I R    imply a truncation bias in a Basu regression.  However, these 
conditions only are relevant in a regression of returns on earnings, as in their (5.1). 22 The relevant 
condition for a Basu association study regression is E(R | R  0)  0 , where ( | )I E I R   .  
Indeed, ( | 0)t t tE R R   ( ( | ) | 0)t t t tE E R R R  ( ( | ) | 0) 0t t t tE R E R R   . The effect of sample 
truncation on the least squares outcome for equation (3.1) can be expressed as: 
( | ,  ) ( ( | ) | ,  )
( | ) ( |  )
E I R truncation rule E E I R R truncation rule
E I R E truncation rule


  
     (5.4) 
This implies that truncation bias arises when ( |  ) 0E truncation rule  .  However, truncating the 
sample on R (or a function of R) does not lead to a bias as, using the law of iterated expectations, 
 E( | R  0)  E(E( | R) | R  0)  0 . Consequently, when the research objective is to estimate the 
functional shape of the conditional expectation E(I |R), return is the correct independent variable, and 
conditioning on it does not induce bias.  
 
                                                 
22 Truncation is figuratively depicted incorrectly in DMR (Figure 2), where the regression of earnings on returns 
minimizes the horizontal (squared) deviations from the regression line, not the vertical deviations. After one notes this, it 
immediately becomes clear from the graph that no truncation bias is present in a Basu regression. DMR also offer a 
“simulation” which they claim should not exhibit non-zero Basu coefficients. Ball et al. (2013, fn 16) disprove this claim.  
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6. Summary and Conclusions 
We present a model of accounting income that is based on salient properties of income 
recognition in accounting, and use it to analyze the econometrics of the Basu asymmetric timeliness 
coefficient. The analysis addresses conceptual and econometric challenges to the coefficient’s 
validity as a measure of conditional conservatism.  We show that the Basu measure is unbiased under 
the null hypothesis of zero asymmetry, and that under the alternative hypothesis it captures 
conditional conservatism as formulated in our model.  
We also demonstrate that conditional conservatism is a function of a variety of firm 
characteristics. Notably, we formalize the intuition and extend the analysis in Roychowdhury and 
Watts (2007), demonstrating econometrically that a negative relation between market-to-book ratios 
and asymmetric timeliness coefficients is expected, but is more complex than previously thought. The 
market-to-book ratio does not per se determine asymmetric timeliness; its effect arises because it is 
correlated with the relative amount of total price revision associated with revisions in “unbooked” 
components such as growth option expectations. We also discuss the effect of firm characteristics 
such as operating and investment cycle length, asset maturity, the correlation between the 
components of returns (hence the degree of diversification) and the length of the fiscal period studied. 
An important issue that context-specific research design must consider is whether it is appropriate to 
control for such firm characteristics. 
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Figure 1: 2 coefficient as a function of ߪ௚ and ߪ௬ 
 
Figure 2: 2 coefficient as a function of xg  and yg
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Appendix A 
Analytical derivation of asymmetric timeliness: The case of correlated x, y, and g.  
We derive the asymmetric timeliness coefficient for a general case where all three 
components of return, x, y, and g, are considered.  The cases when some of these components are 
omitted follow immediately. We omit subscripts t when all random variables are contemporaneous. 
We start by noting that: 
1 1 1 1
1
cov( (1 ) , | 0)
var( | 0)
cov( , | 0)
var( | 0)
cov( , | 0) cov( , | 0)
var( | 0)
t t t t t t t t t t t t
t t t t t t t
x w y w y g x y g R
R R
x w y x y g R
R R
x x y g R wy x y g R
R R
              
    
       
   (A1) 
And 
2
cov( , | 0) cov( , | 0)
var( | 0)
x x y g R wy x y g R
R R
              (A2)  
Exploiting symmetry we have: 
2 2 1
ˆplim
cov( , | 0) cov( , | 0)
var( | 0) var( | 0)
cov( , | 0) cov( , | 0)
var( | 0)
wy x y g R wy x y g R
R R R R
wy x y g R wy x y g R
R R
    
       
       
     (A3) 
where 1( 0)w y   is an indicator variable taking a value of one in case y < 0 and zero otherwise. 
Define z x g  , 2 var( ),z z  and  
2 2
cov( , ) cov( , )corr( , ) .
var( ) var( ) 2
xy x yg g
x xg x g g
y x y gz y
y x g
        
      
To show that is 2 0  positive it suffices to show that 0  , where: 
 
Note further that: 
cov( , | 0) cov( , | 0) 0.wy z y R wy z y R       
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2 2
2 0.5 2 2 2
1 1 2( , ) exp
2 (1 ) 2(1 )z y z z y y
z zy yz y         
             
 is bivariate normal 
density and
2 22 2(0)( | 0) ( | 0) var( )
1 (0) 2
z z y yE z y R E R R R
   

       .  
The integrals can be evaluated explicitly under the normality assumption, first noting that symmetry 
implies Pr( 0)R  = 0.5.    
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Further, making the same transformation, and integrating by parts it can be shown that: 
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(A6) 
where / 2 arctan( )    , and 2 0.5 (0, )(1 )
y z
z
    
   . 
By analogy (making the same substitution as above) we have: 
     (A7) 
Using integration by parts, it can be further shown that: 
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and, by analogy, 
      (A9) 
Now we can use these results to evaluate the expression for  : 
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(A10) 
Rearranging this expression yields: 
   (A11) 
Now the asymmetric timeliness coefficient can be computed as follows: 
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